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INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this chapter is to review the fiscal and monetary
policies of Poland for EU accession and to extract their guiding precepts.
Only the most essential aspects of fiscal and monetary convergence are
examined, with some attention to institutional convergence. An iri-depth
analysis of institutional convergence falls beyond the boundaries of this
study, as its main focus is on the systemic foundations of macroeconomic
stabilization policies during the economic transition and in the course of
preparations for EU accession. The chapter also examines policy options
for the post-accession macroeconomic policy strategy which will focus on
preparations for adopting the euro.
This chapter underlines the importance of imposing and preserving fiscal
discipline and political stability on the road to Poland's accession to the EU
which took place on 1 May 2004, and to the future adoption of the euro.
Special attention is drawn to fiscal restructuring and bringing about compliT
ance with the European System of National Accounts. In addition, the
implications of the expected net transfers from the EU budget are examined.
The evolution of Poland's monetary policy, which is marked by a passage
from a simple policy framework based on a hard peg to a modern, complex
regime based on direct inflation targeting (DIT) is examined. With respect
to the tasks related to monetary convergence to the euro, the main analytical hypothesis is that the current strict DIT regime is not conducive to
adopting the euro. It needs to be more flexible, that is, to incorporate the
objective of stabilizing the exchange rate, which, in essence, means the lowering of the exchange rate risk premium. However, it is advised that the
central bank's main commitment to the low inflation target is preserved
until the very end of the euro convergence.
As this study focuses on the systemic foundations of macroeconomic stabilization policies it does not provide a detailed account of the actual record
of real and nominal convergence in Poland. The gradual advancement of
174

Monetary andfiscal policy in Poland during EU accession

175

Poland's monetary policy has been so far consistent with the task of laying
down solid foundations for a functioning market economy that, is capable of
withstanding competition within the EU- At the final-stage of convergence
to the euro, Poland's monetary policy needs to be focused on achieving the
convergence benchmarks embodied in the Maastricht criteria. In general
terms, this means embracing an appropriate policy framework and a
sequence of policy adjustments that will be most conducive to achieving
price stability and securing a smooth currency convergence. A proposal for
such policy adjustments is outlined in section 6.5 on the sequencing of monetary policy for euro adoption.
The analysis begins with a brief description of the stabilization policies
in the early 1990s which established an effective springboard for convergence to the EU/EMU. Next, fiscal policy considerations are discussed,
followed by the overview of systemic changes in Poland's monetary policy
framework. Subsequently, alternative policy proposals for convergence
to the euro are presented. A synthesis of the key policy prescriptions concludes this chapter.

6.2

A D V A N C I N G M A C R O E C O N O M I C POLICY:
FROM TRANSITION TO E U ENTRY

Policies for the accession of Poland to the EU constitute an extension, of stabilization strategies that were e_nacted at the start of the country's swift transition from central planning to a market economy in the early 1990s. At that
time, the initial infusion of economic stability posed a particularly serious
challenge to the Polish economy which was plagued by a severe crisis stemming directly from the pitfalls of the communist central planning. Among
the most severe rigidities of the previous system were highly regulated prices
set at ceilings far below market equilibrium, monopoly structures in the
financial and industrial sectors, the execution of the central plan as the main
business objective, non-convertible currency, and the arbitrarily-imposed
trade ties with the former Soviet bloc (Bruno, 1992).
In order to underpin a decisive departure from the inefficiencies of
central planning, the now democratically elected, independent Polish
Government instituted a radical programme of reforms in January 1990.
The so-called Bajcerowicz Plan was aimed at dismantling the most obstructive foundations of the former command economy system (Bruno, 1992;
Sachs, 1993). The main precepts of this radical reform programme included
far-reaching price liberalization, full currency convertibility on current
account, trade liberalization, fiscal consolidation and monetary policy discipline to be achieved through the hard peg of the Polish zloty to the US
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dollar. As a consequence of massive price liberalization and the incomplete
decomposition and privatization of state-owned monopolies, producer and
retail prices quickly rose to market equilibrium levels, which spurred a
short-lived corrective inflation that on the CPI-basis reached 640 per cent
in 1989 and declined below the annual rate of 50 per cent only in 1992.
The early 'shock therapy' programme in Poland was based on the reformers' notion of 'extraordinary polities', that is, that the collapse of the old
system created a unique window of opportunity that provided the government with the special mandate to proclaim such reforms. Consequently,
strong political will and commitment led to the establishment of the foundations of macroeconomic stability and, later, to the pursuit of macroeconomic reforms for EU accession. Polish society, having vivid memories of
the inefficiencies and high social costs of central planning, has strongly
endorsed the reform programme and supported the government's commitment to laying down foundations for a functioning market economy capable
of withstanding competition within the EU. However, social endorsement
has not always been unequivocal as the transition to a deregulated and privatized economy has carried considerable welfare costs, such as the gradual
increase in (mostly structural) unemployment that reached a monthly
average of 19.8 per cent in the peak year of 2002. (Table 6.1)
The early macroeconomic stabilization policies brought about considerable progress in economic stability in the late 1990s during the more
advanced stage of transition and active preparations for the EU accession.
This progress is reflected by the set of indicators presented in Table 6.1.
The real economy and financial sector annual data show that Poland's
monetary authorities have been able to contain inflation while avoiding
economic recession. Yet, in the post-accession period, there is still a need
to improve fiscal discipline and enact long-term labour market reforms to
ease persistently high unemployment.
As shown in Table 6.1, between 1997-2004 the CPI-based inflation fell
from double digits to a low single digit level that in the last three reported
years was roughly commensurate with the Maastricht price stability benchmark qualifying for accession to the euro.1 Yet the ambitious disinflation
effort succeeded only by applying very high real interest rates which
undoubtedly contributed to a significant slowdown of economic growth in
2001-02. In that period, the inflation adjusted short-term credit refinancing
rate was maintained at extremely high levels by the National Bank of Poland
(NBP). This rate, which serves as the policy reference rate for NBP, reached
its peak of 9 per cent in 2001. Having contained inflation at a sustainable
'safe' level through such highly restrictive monetary policy, the NBP was
able to reduce the real short-term interest rate to 2.1 per cent by 2004. Most
importantly, high real interest rates helped establish a necessary degree of
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Selected measures of real and financial stability in Poland,
1997-2004
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Real GDP growth rate
Unemployment rate
(ILO def.)
CPI-inflation rate
PPI-inflation rate
Real compensation per
employee (whole economy)
Labour productivity
(% growth)
Unit labour cost
(% growth)
Govt, budget deficit
(% GDP)
Govt, total debt (% GDP)
Real short-term int. rate
(avg. monthly)
Bank lending (avg. m.
growth rate)
M3 (avg. m. growth rate)
Current account (% GDP)
PLN-per-EUR (ECU)
(avg. monthly rate)
Consumer confidence index"
New job offers in '000b

6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 5.5
10.9 10.2 13.4 16.4 18.5 19.8 19.2 19.1
14.9 11.8 7.3 10.1
12.5 7.5 5.8 7.9
21.0 16.0 13.2 11.9

0.8 3.5
1.6 7.0
4.2 4.8

5.5
3.1
8.0

1.9
0.5
2.6

1.7

3.7 46.6 6.1

2.4

7.0

6.4

16.5 13.2

5.8

5.2 11.5 -1.6 -9.7 -2.2

3.9

-4.0 -2.1 -1.4 -0.7 -3.8 -3.6 -3.9 -5.6
n.a. n.a. 40.1 36.8 36.7 41.1 45.4 47.2
8.4 7.7 6.0 7.1 9.0 6.7 4.8 2.1
33.8 27.0 26.7 17.6

7.4

4.0 "7.1 n.a.

27.9 24.7 20.1 11.9 9.2 -2.0 8.8 9.4
-3.7 -4.1 -7.6 -6.0 -2.8 -2.6 -2.2 -1.5
3.54 3.92 4.23 4.01 3.67 3.86 4.40 4.53
103
916

100 85
751 681

80
606

75
406

76 *" 77 n.a.
550 730 n.a.

Notes:
a. Ratio of optimistic to pessimistic consumers periodically compiled and reported by
Rzeczpospolita Daily.
b. Reported by search firms.
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Warsaw; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance,
Macroeconomic Survey (various issues); Rzeczpospolita (various editions).
policy credibility that contributed to declining inflation expectations, which
subsequently suppressed wage demands in both the public and the private
sector, as reflected by the parallel to inflation decline in real compensation
per employee. At the same time, a combination of large direct investments
from domestic and foreign sources coupled with a squeeze on wage demands
from high unemployment led to the accelerated growth of labour productivity outpacing the growth of labour compensation. As a result, unit labour
costs that were still rising during the 1997-2001 period began to recede over
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the following three years. Along with the monetary easing that has been
evident over the recent two-year period, the bank lending and the M3
money aggregate returned to higher growth rates reinvigorating investment
and real GDP growth. As a consequence, the declining unit labour costs
along with a brisk demand for credit and rising investment have recently
contributed to the growth of industrial production and exports. They have
also reduced unemployment, albeit at a very slow pace.
As shown in Table 6.1, the macroeconomic stability conditions are
strongly correlated with consumer confidence and job market conditions.
High unemployment along with a wage squeeze is not conducive to raising
consumer confidence and promoting growth in consumption. In fact, the
recently renewed economic recovery is mainly driven by the increase in
private investment and to some extent by sharply rising exports to the EU.
These spending components contribute to a recognizable job creation, as
reflected by new job offers, and to a significant improvement in the current
account position. Nevertheless, a sustainable economic recovery is likely to
depend on higher consumer spending, which is yet to materialize. As a
matter of fact, it may take some time for consumer to recover from the
recent drop in confidence about future economic conditions. One may hope
that the stimulus of the EU accession-related income transfers along with
the continuous commitment to a macroeconomic stability that no longer
needs to be supported by excessively restrictive policies may ultimately
improve this situation.
The disciplined economic policies of the centre-right coalition government pursued prior to 2001 did not help Poland's now-notorious political
instability. After losing the 2001 election, the Solidarity government was
replaced by a coalition of left-wing parties that was initially less inclined to
maintaining fiscal discipline. However, the required commitment to a
sound fiscal policy, which is a pillar of the post-EU accession strategy and
its focus on convergence to the euro, forced the new socialist government
to outline a budget-balancing strategy in its April 2004 Convergence
Programme in a way conducive to euro convergence. Nonetheless, unpopular budget cuts cannot immediately improve the confidence of the general
public in the economy.
In retrospect, both the pre- and the post-EU accession strategies can be
viewed as a logical extension of the macroeconomic policies pursued
during the economic transition of the 1990s. The process of navigating the
macroeconomic convergence becomes increasingly challenging in Poland
due to unfavourable demographic dynamics and the high social costs of
disciplined policies.
One may further argue that in order to be successful and sustainable,
the convergence strategy in Poland must be highly transparent. Since the
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EU/EMU accession entails certain short-run costs, while its benefits are
likely to materialize only in the long-run, there is a serious risk that the net
social costs will outweigh the benefits in the near future, which may erode
public endorsement of the convergence programme. Thus, to sustain
social endorsement, the government must fully explain the detailed aspects
of the convergence strategies and the expected social costs. Therefore, a
high transparency of the convergence programme is a key prerequisite for
its overall success.

6.3

FISCAL CONVERGENCE

The main aim of fiscal policy adjustments in Poland in the course of preparations for EU accession, included laying the ground for a sustainable fiscal
discipline, developing compliance with the European System of National
Accounts and reforming the tax system in congruence with Chapter 10
(Taxation) of the EU acquis communautaire. Accordingly, Poland had to
develop institutional capacity in the area of taxation and in aligning its legislation with that of EU. A number of changes were made in the area of
indirect taxation, including VAT and excise duties. In general terms,
without resorting to the complexity of the detailed tasks, special attention
had to be paid to the scope and definition of VAT rates, particularly the
extensive use of zero-rating, as well as to the vast tax exemptions.2 New
taxes were introduced with regard to direct taxation, such as a 20 per cent
tax on interest income and a temporary 2 per cent tax on outward capital
movements by residents only. Still, on EU entry in May 2004, Poland had
to raise VAT and excise taxes on a number of products (including construction materials, tobacco, mineral oils and so on), which induced a
short-lived jump in inflation.
As a member of the EU, Poland is obliged to provide the European
Commission with a detailed report on fiscal stance, including general government deficit and debt statistics, in accordance with the European System
of National Accounts (ESA'95). In preparation for such reports, the Polish
Government has redesigned its budgetary process by distinguishing
between three basic subsectors of public finance: central government, local
government and social security funds. This distinction has proven to be
very helpful for enacting appropriate fiscal reforms aimed at decentralizing
the budget, streamlining funds to their main intended recipients and broadening the tax base.
Furthermore, in order to develop compliance with the EU budgetary procedures, the Polish Government has enacted a series of legislative documents,
including the 'Medium Term Public Finance Strategy' of September 2003,
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the 'Programme of Consolidation of Public Expenditures' of January 2004
and 'The Convergence Programme' of April 2004. A driving force behind the
ongoing fiscal consolidation is the officially declared plan to adopt the euro
in the unspecified future. Accordingly, the fiscal authorities are now facing
the challenge of maintaining fiscal discipline as stipulated by the EU
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). They are compelled to demonstrate efforts
to bring the budget deficit down to 3 per cent in relation to GDP. In fact, the
SGP has been used extensively by the authorities as a politically convenient
excuse for maintaining fiscal discipline. Aspirations to enter the eurozone
provide a compelling justification for the government to reduce budgetary
expenditures and, at the same time, to maintain taxes at a level low enough
to promote growth and high enough to balance the budget. For instance, in
response to the deteriorating budgetary situation, the government adopted
an expenditure rule (in 2002) according to which central government spending was limited to an annual rise of 1 per cent above the inflation rate. The
need to undergo further fiscal consolidation is quite apparent. As evidenced
by the data in Table 6.1, there is a propagation of the general government
budget deficit to the degree exceeding the maximum allowed benchmark of
3 per cent of GDP and an increase in public debt getting closer to the
maximum of 60 per cent of GDP stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty.
The pronounced acceleration of the general government budget deficit
over the past three years poses a serious problem to the implementation of
fiscal consolidation. Yet, there are some optimistic developments. The
expected increase in economic growth is likely to ease pressure on the deficit
and to stabilize the level of indebtedness. Taking into account the faster
economic growth that has been recently driven by high investment and
exports, the projected decline of the deficit from 4.2 per cent of GDP in
2005 to 1.5 per cent in 2007, as specified in the Polish Government
Convergence Programme (Republic of Poland, 2004) appears to be realistic. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, the government needs to reduce
expenditures on public administration and on selected social programmes.
While it is reasonable to expect reduced costs of debt servicing due to
steadily declining interest rates, spending cuts on public administration and
social programmes will have to be decisively administered. However, spending cuts on social programmes may pose a major challenge as they are politically unpopular and risky.
Major challenges to a successful implementation of fiscal consolidation
can be detected by analysing recent budgetary developments and projections within the three basic subsectors of the budget, as defined by ESA'95
(Table 6.2).
Large central government expenditures that are allocated predominantly
to social programmes and public administration constitute the primary
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General government budget balance and public debt in Poland
(ESA'95) (% GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

General government
budget balance

-1.8 -3.5 -4.0 -4.1 -5.7

-4.2 -3.3

-1.5

Central government
Local government
Social security funds

-1.9 -4.2 -4.6 -5.6 -6.4 -5.5 -4.8 -3.4
-0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1
+ 0.6 +1.0 +0.9 +1.7 +0.9 +1.8 +1.9 +2.0

General government debt

36.6 36.7 41.2 45.3 49.0 51.9 52.9 52.3

Note: Ministry of Finance forecasts are indicated in italics.
Source: Republic of Poland, Convergence Programme, Warsaw, April 2004.
area of concern within the consolidated budget. In the 2004 budget, the
consolidated expenditures in relation to GDP reached 23.5 per cent for
social transfers, 15.1 per cent for public administration, 9 per cent for public
consumption and only 2.9 per cent for interest on public debt (Republic of
Poland, 2004, p. 26). Since the central government conducts the majority
of spending on social programmes and public administration, its deficit
level reached 6.4 per cent while the local government deficit was only 0.2
per cent of GDP. Needless to say, the success of fiscal consolidation projected in Table 6.2 will depend on the government's ability and determination to reduce spending in these politically sensitive areas.3 At the local
level, the major accession-related task for governments is to improve their
absorptive capacity to dispose the EU transfers related to common agricultural policy (CAP) subsidies as well as structural and cohesion funds.
A serious challenge to fiscal consolidation stems from rising transfers
related to the ageing population. The need to foster EU tax coordination
and to restructure the public finances in order to prepare for the budgetary
consequences of the ageing population was emphasized in the 1999
Commission report o n economic and structural reform in the EU (Cardiff
II). The gravity of the ageing problem in Poland can be illustrated by the
ratio of retired to working age population, which is expected to rise from
the recently reported level of 62 per cent in 2002 to the projected 69 per cent
in 2010 and 94 per cent in 2050. The large share of retirees, along with the
negative growth of the country's total population will impose a serious
rigidity on social spending programmes.
Within the next several years, the social security fund is expected to show
a rising surplus (Table 6.2). This projected surplus stems from the ongoing
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contributions to the special 'open retirement funds' by the insured persons,
while the first payments from these funds are scheduled to take place only
in 2009 (the intended year for adopting the euro!). The changes adopted by
the EU Council, of Ministers at its March 2005 meeting which now allow
for accounting contributions to these funds as budget revenues are of
crucial importance for Poland, as their inclusion may help the country meet
the Maastricht budget deficit criterion by the time of examination for the
euro entry.
In addition to reforming government expenditures, policymakers face
the challenge of determining an optimal level and pragmatic rules of taxation. The efforts in this direction pursued by the Polish Government are
encouraging. Since 1999, the Ministry of Finance has reduced corporate
income taxes from 27 to 19 per cent, closing at the same time many of
the existing tax loopholes. It also allowed for accelerated depreciation
allowances and established a special fund for restructuring the budgetary
obligations of some firms with serious liquidity problems. Personal income
taxes have been also significantly reduced. In spite of these reductions in
tax rates, tax revenues have been growing steadily. The 2006 Budget
Proposal introducing a linear flat tax of 18 per cent (submitted in March
2005 by the Ministry of Finance), if passed by the parliament, should
further contribute to higher tax revenues as it will likely translate into accelerated income growth. In addition, tax revenues should also benefit from
the existing institutional improvements in tax administration and. in the
collection system.
It should be further noted that the official programme of fiscal consolidation (Republic of Poland, 2004) will materialize only in the absence of
serious threats to financial stability. Among these might be the possibility
of a significant depreciation of the Polish zloty (PLN) as well as the danger
of renewed inflationary expectations that would have to be restrained by
the NBP with higher interest. These would contribute to higher debt service
payments. Other dangers include a possible propagation of political risk
stemming from the recent corruption scandals involving government
officials. In addition, the erosion of public support for the government due
to its inability to reduce rampant unemployment may further exacerbate
the political risk.
Poland's membership of the EU is likely to improve the state of public
finance due to the injection of net transfers from the EU budget. The main
components of estimated transfers and contributions to the EU budget
are shown in Table 6.3. It should, however, be noted that the presented data
are only estimates based on the results of accession negotiations at the
December 2002 Copenhagen Summit and do not necessarily reflect actual
appropriations and payments which are yet to be disclosed.
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EU appropriations for Poland (EUR million in 1999 prices)

Total transfers to Poland
Pre-accession assistance
Agriculture (total):
1. market measures
2. direct payments
3. development of rural areas
Structural actions (total):
1. structural funds
2. cohesion funds
Internal policies (total):
1. existing policies
2. institutions building
3. Schengen instrument
Special cash-flow facility
Total contributions by Poland to EU budget
Traditional resources
VAT resource
GNI resource
British rebate
Net appropriations balance

2004

2005

2006

2983
970
425
135
0
290
860
834
26
285
154
38
93
443

5068
823
1512
350
557
605
1776
1482
294
407
266
48
93
550

5498
509
1934
377
675
882
2107
1578
.529
499
359
46
94
450

-1579
-123
-194
-1114
-148
1404

-2454
-213
-304"-1707
-230
2614

-2520
-214
-310
-1752
-244
2978

Source: Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2004).
Among the receipts, structural funds are the largest initial component,
followed by CAP subsidies. Structural funds are designated mostly for infrastructural projects thus the data in Table 6.3 reflect mostly granted funds,
which may take longer to be actually transferred. The assistance to the agricultural sector is eXpected'to rise in proportion to other receipt items during
the years following formal EU entry. CAP payments to Polish farmers will
reach respectively 55, 60 and 65 per cent of the level of corresponding subsidies in the incumbent EU member states during the first three years of
membership (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 2004). This is because full-scale
assistance would be extremely expensive for the EU, given the large size of
Polands' agricultural employment, which comprised 19.6 per cent of total
employment in 2002, while the sector's value added was merely ,3.1 per cent
of total value added in the economy (European Commission, 2003). Direct
payments to farmers are expected to be the fastest growing component
among all transfer categories. In contrast, the assistance aimed at strengthening internal policies will rise at a slower rate. These funds are particularly
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needed in the early stage of membership as they are aimed at strengthening
institutions indispensable for the implementation of Community Jegislation
and for reinforcing border controls (the Schengen Instrument). In addition,
Poland will receive large direct cash transfers (the Special cash-flow facility)
designated to improve absorptive capacity and to cushion the fiscal burden
of the initially large contributions to the EU budget.
Poland's contributions to the EU budget will come from three main
sources: (1) traditional resources (mainly revenues from import duties and
agricultural duties); (2) value added tax (VAT) revenues; and (3) resources
based on gross national income (GNI). Along with other EU member
states, Poland is also obliged to contribute to the 'British rebate', or special
VAT refund scheme granted by the EU to the United Kingdom.
In summary, Poland is expected to be a net recipient of sizeable funds
from the EU, estimated at 0.8 per cent of GDP for 2004, gradually increasing to 1.3 per cent for 2005 and 1.4 per cent for 2006.4 However, the large
scale of these net transfers is not automatically guaranteed, as some delays
in CAP subsidies due to bureaucratic hurdles have already been reported.
In addition, some structural fund appropriations that have already been
granted may take some time to materialize.
There is still another important dimension of the necessary fiscal reform,
that is, the determination of an appropriate type of fiscal governance.
Following a proposal made by Hallerbeg et al. (2004), fiscal policies can be
bound by rules, thus following a contract approach, or they can be based
on a high degree of finance ministry discretion, consistent with the delegation approach to budgetary decisions. These authors show empirically that,
based on the EU experience, coalition governments are more likely to
employ the contract approach, while single or majority party governments
are likely to delegate the budgetary decision-making power to finance ministers in order to alleviate the coordination problem that is inherent in the
fiscal policy process. One may reasonably assume that these findings will
also hold for Poland in the near future. Therefore, the design of a fiscal
policy framework that is consistent with the delegation approach seems to
be a viable option, since a majority party government is likely to prevail in
the future, after the recent wave of consolidation of major political parties
in Poland.

6.4

MONETARY CONVERGENCE

Concurrently with fiscal reforms, Poland's monetary policy regime had to
undergo equally challenging changes during the course of preparations for
the EU accession. The general objective of these adjustments was to ensure
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a sustainable degree of financial stability in the spirit of one of the three
Copenhagen EU accession criteria, namely, the task of establishing a wellfunctioning market economy. In order to generate a stable financial environment, the NBP faced the task of devising a proper monetary policy
framework that would, at minimum, effectively contain inflation, mitigate
exchange rate risk, and help establish a solid record of policy credibility.
Defining such, a policy framework turned out to be an intricate task at
the early stage of preparations for the EU accession. The exchange rate
anchor had to be given up relatively early, as the combination of currency
peg and high, double-digit inflation led to real currency appreciation, which
in turn exacerbated Poland's current account deficit and deteriorated the
risk structure of capital inflows (the move toward short-term and away
from long-term capital inflows). The evolution of the country's exchange
rate system is synthesized in Table 6.4.
The hard peg to the US dollar was instrumental in the elimination of the
corrective inflation and the diffusion of-the monetary overhang in the early
1990s. Once an acceptable degree of financial stability appeared in sight,
the monetary authorities enacted a soft peg in the form of the crawling
devaluation with a 7 per cent symmetric band around the parity rate on 16
May 1995. A further notable move toward greater flexibility coincided with
the official inception of direct inflation targeting in January 1999. DIT is a
monetary policy framework that is based on the assumption of long-term
price stability as the official policy goal through designation of the official
Table 6.4

Evolution of Poland's exchange rate regime
Exchange rate regime Currency
(Classification)*
basket

1 Jan. 1990-17 May 1991
17 May 1991-30 Apr. 1993
1 May 1993-15 May 1995
16 May 1995-24 Feb. 1998
25 Feb. 1998-31 Dec. 1998
1 Jan. 1999-11 Apr. 2000

hard peg (2)
crawling peg (5)
crawling peg (5)
crawling band (9)
crawling band (9)
crawling band (9)

12 Apr. 2000-present

free float (13)

9500 PLZ/USD
USD
5-currency basket
basket
basket
EUR 55%
USD 45%
-

Tolerance
band
+ / - 1%
+ / - 1%
+ /-7%
+ / - 10%
+ / - 15%
-

Note: * The exchange rate classification number is based on the 'fine course' determined
by Rogoff et al. (2003, p. 55), and it ranges from the leastflexible(no separate legal tender =
class 1) to mostflexibleexchange rate arrangements (freefloat,class 13; freely falling, class
14, and dual market in which parallel market data is missing, class 15).
Source: Own compilation based on IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements
and Restrictions (various editions).
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target ranges for the inflation rate (Orlowski, 2000). DIT focuses directly
on achieving the predetermined inflation target and by this virtue it differs
from alternative monetary policy regimes that may aim at lowering
inflation in an. indirect way, for instance by focusing first on exchange rate
stability objective.
With the inception of DIT, the exchange rate band was effectively
widened to 15 per cent around the central parity, which in essence denoted
abandonment of the exchange rate based monetary regime. Once price stability became the predominant objective of monetary policy, the crawling
devaluation mechanism could no longer be maintained since the forced currency weakening promulgated inflation via the active exchange rate channel
of policy transmission. In recognition of this threat to price, stability,
Poland's monetary authorities finally embraced a free float in .April 2000.
After abandoning the exchange rate anchor in May 1995, the NBP was
prompted to search for alternative regimes that would uphold the necessary
policy discipline. As a consequence, it carried out several, rather ineffective
policy experiments, beginning with interest rate targeting in 1996. This
option proved to be flawed in the presence of sizeable capital inflows which
induced large shocks to market interest rates in a continuously vulnerable
financial system. For this reason, the NBP moved to monetary base targeting in 1997 and M2 money growth targeting in 1998. These alternatives
proved to be ineffective as well, particularly in the presence of some contagion effects from the Asian and Russian financial crises which infused large
shocks to money balances. In addition, monetary targeting was not practical in an economy undergoing fast-paced monetization, as reflected by the
overall growth of the M2 to GDP ratio from 15 per cent in 1991 to 43 per
cent in 2002. As a result, money balances grew at a much faster rate than
GDP, contributing to a large instability of income elasticity of money
demand, which in turn made monetary targeting entirely implausible
(Orlowski, 2004a).
Under such circumstances, inflation targeting appeared to be the only
viable option for Poland as it could offer an effective disciplinary anchor for
monetary policy which got lost after departing from the currency peg; it
could also underpin the authorities' commitment to disinflation (Jonas and
Mishkin, 2003; Eichengreen, 2005; Orlowski, 2005a). However, the inception of the DIT .framework in January 1999 took place at the earliest possible time or, as argued by Christofferssen and Wescott (1999), even slightly
prematurely, since inflation was still running at double-digit levels and a
prior record of price stability had not yet been established. In spite of the
violation of some prerequisites for the DIT inception specified as essential
by Mishkin (2000), the DIT framework was embraced by the NBP as it
entailed important benefits, which prevailed over the possible costs of
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missing overly optimistic inflation targets (Orlowski, 2001b, 2005a).
Among the important DIT benefits is the explicit cornmitment to achieve
ambitious and transparent inflation goals. An additional DIT advantage
that is particularly pertinent to convergence to a common currency system
is its ability to insulate the economy from balance of payments shocks. For
this reason, DIT is an attractive policy option for Poland since inflation
fluctuations there are predominantly influenced by nominal supply-side
shocks, rather than real exchange rate and balance of payments shocks, as
is empirically proven by Dibooglu and Kiitan (2005). In hindsight, it is wellestablished in the literature that inflation targets must be believable in order
to be effective; therefore, DIT could be introduced in Poland only when a
minimum degree of 'foundational credibility' was in place.
Due to the key strategic objective of reducing inflation from doubledigits to a low, sustainable level, a strict variant of DIT (as defined by
Svensson, 1999) with year-end, narrowly defined targets appeared to be a
viable policy option. As summarized in Table 6.5, the early variant of DIT
was based on a strict CPI-inflation target of 6.6-7.8 per cent specified for
December 1999. It seemed to be quite ambitious, considering the fact that
the average monthly inflation in 1998 was 11.8 per cent (as shownin Table
6.1). The initial-actual target realization was far from being satisfactory, as
December 1999 inflation was 2 per cent higher than the upper bound of the
Table 6.5

Evolution of direct inflation targeting in Poland

Type
of
DIT
Initial
regime
Jan.
1999

Main
target(s)

Actual
annualized
CPI
inflation

Strict, CPI inflation: Dec. 1999:
single Long-term
9.8%
target goal Year-end
target 6.67.8% Dec.99

Current Strict, CPI inflation
regime single trajectory:
(2005) target midpoint
2.5%,
+ / - 1%
tolerance
band

Corresponding Policy
exchange
transparency
rate
regime

Formal
plan for
euro
adoption

Crawling
devaluation
with a wide
band

n.a.

Dec. 2004: Pure
4.4%
float

Medium,
published
inflation
reports, no
published
forecast
-High,
published:
inflation
projection,
reports and
policy
assumptions

Yes,
date not
specified

Source: Own compilation based on NBP, Monetary Policy Assumptions (various issues).
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operating target. It should also be noted that a similar mismatch was
repeated in the second year of DIT. The target for December 2000 was set
at 5.4^6.8 per cent, while actual inflation reached 8.5 per cent. In response
to such prolonged target overshooting, the NBP took decisive policy steps
to contain inflation to the degree commensurate with its ambitious target.
It applied an extremely restrictive course of monetary policy as reflected by
the average monthly real short-term (three months T-bill) interest rate,
which reached 8.48 per cent during the January 1998-December 1999
period, and an even higher rate of 8.60 per cent between January 2000 and
June 2001. As a result, actual inflation at the end of 2001 fell to 3.6 per cent,
well below the target of 6-8 per cent, and at the end of 2002 it fell to 1.9 per
cent, also considerably below the 4-6 per cent target. In essence, it took
approximately two and a half years to bring inflation down to the desired
level, or in other words, to align private sector inflation expectations with
the central bank forecast. Needless to say, the NBP was successful in establishing a solid ground for policy credibility and price stability, but it did so
by applying an extremely restrictive course of monetary policy, which,
without doubt, entailed certain welfare costs and contributed to the economic slowdown in 2001-02.
Once a satisfactory degree of financial stability was achieved, the NBP
altered the DIT strategy by replacing year-end operating targets with the
trend consistent linear inflation trajectory. By doing so, it has improved the
transparency and credibility of the DIT regime, in line with the arguments
introduced to the literature by King (1996). The trajectory approach is
believed to be superior to the year-end target specification for several
reasons. The stable linear target allows for expanding the time horizon of
low inflation expectations, thus it contributes to lower long-term interest
rates and promotes private sector long-term borrowing and investment.
Moreover, the linear trajectory is also beneficial for resisting political pressures on the central bank, which is not the case of year-end targets. In principle, the trajectory maintains a steady course that is not subject to
negotiations', while year-end targets are annually adjusted, which leaves
them exposed to potential pressures.
The current linear inflation trajectory in Poland is formulated in consistency with the precepts of monetary convergence to the euro. The midpoint
is set at 2.5 per cent - the rate roughly corresponding with the anticipated
Maastricht reference rate. It is surrounded by the symmetric tolerance
band of 1 per cent that allows for accommodating possible temporary
shocks. In addition, the current DIT policy is highly transparent, as the
NBP regularly publishes quarterly and annual inflation reports and discloses its inflation projection to the general public. However, the current
strict DIT framework, is not fully consistent with the key objectives of
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monetary convergence to the euro as it focuses exclusively on the inflation
target and does not incorporate an exchange rate stability objective. The
NBP is continuously committed to the pure float, perhaps due to the technical difficulties in determining a long-run sustainable market equilibrium
rate of PLN in EUR terms that could serve as a targeted reference rate.
Modifications of Poland's and other new EU member states' monetary
regimes on the final passage towards the euro will have to take into account
a number of potential risks (Masson, 1999; Schadler, 2004). Chief among
them are risks attributed to asymmetric shocks. In order to mitigate such
risks, a clear and transparent monetary policy framework needs to be in
place as it'will be imperative to explain how disruptions to financial conditions will be dealt with. The effective absorption of exogenous shocks
becomes particularly important upon entry to ERM II. Fiscal and monetary policies need to provide capacity to support the limits on exchange rate
volatility imposed by this interim mechanism preceding euro adoption.
Monetary policy in particular needs to embrace a mechanism of responding to contagion effects of possible future financial crises. For this reason,
a continuous commitment to inflation targeting would offer a necessary
cushion for absorbing such effects.
It should be noted at this juncture that there is a compelling historical
record of Poland's effective responses to international financial crises. Two
particular episodes underscore this claim:
(1)
(2)

the policy of counteracting possible contagion effects of the August/
September 1998 Russian financial crisis, and
the strategy of dealing with the May 2004 'accession syndrome'.

The Russian moratorium on repayment of foreign currency debt declared
on 29 August 1998 triggered a wave of contagion effects to international
financial markets. Poland dealt with the shock relatively well as the government launched the so-called 'de-coupling' from Russia (Orlowski,
2001a). Empirical research on this subject proves that such a strategic
approach was indeed successful. There were only mild contagion effects
from Russia to Poland (as oppose to the Czech Republic or Hungary) in
the aftermath of the crisis (Linne, 1999), particularly with respect to
eurobonds (Gelos and Sahay, 2001). This is because the PLN and the
Russian ruble displayed a limited co-movement at the time, which was not
the case with other Central and East European currencies. In addition,
depreciation of PLN in USD terms was considerably milder relative to the
fall of other currencies in the region, which might have stemmed from the
NBP decision to cut interest rates at that time, while other central banks
were forced to raise them in order to prevent capital outflows (Orlowski,
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2001a). In an effort to insulate the Polish financial market from Russia's
troubles, the NBP, by cutting interest rates, sent a 'signalling effect' to international markets* underpinning the country's systemic resilience to external nominal shocks. In sum, thanks to its strong policy base, Poland
weathered relatively well the shocks from the Russian financial crisis (as
well as from the 1997-98 Asian crisis) that reverberated across the international financial markets, while many other countries fell victim to recession.
Its currency remained strong, capital inflows continued and the banks were
not imperilled.
Another noteworthy incidence of asymmetric shocks is related to the
May 2004 EU accession. However, that was much easier to deal with than
the 1998 disturbance, as Poland's economic policy base and its systemic
foundation had become considerably stronger, resulting in the overall
nominal shock being milder. The scope of the accession-related real and
nominal disturbance is reflected by changes in the selected macroeconomic
variables shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6

The impact of Poland's E U accession on selected
macroeconomic variables
2003

2004 1st Q 2004 2nd Q

Real GDPa
Private consumption3
'Public consumption"
Gross fixed capital formation3
Exports3
Imports3

3.8
3.1
0.4
-0.9
14.7
9.3

6.9
3.9
1.3
3.5
16.0
11.3

6.1
3.8
2.5
3.6
11.3
8.3

Real industrial output3
Real labour productivity3
Average nominal wage in industry3
Unit labour cost of industry (nominal)3
Unemployment rate (ILO definition)

8.6
11.4
3.0
-7.5
19.6

18.7
19.6
6.6
-10.9
20.7

16.6
17.0
4.8
-10.5
19.1

HICP inflation
Broad money growth rate (nominal)3'b
Net domestic bank credit growth rate (nom.)3
PLN per EUR (period average)

0.7
1.5
5.2
4.40

1.8
5.3
6.2
4.78

3.4
7.1
4.6
4.69

Notes:
a. Year-on-year percentage change (period average).
b. Including foreign currency deposits.
Source: Central Statistical Office, Warsaw and Osterreichische Nationalbank, Focus on
Transition, 2/20Q4.

Monetary andfiscalpolicy in Poland during EU accession

191

The real economy effects directly related to the EU accession included
theacceleration of real GDP and industrial production in the first quarter
of 2004. This phenomenon has been labelled by Polish economic analysts
as 'the accession syndrome', which was based on a switch in industrial
activity from the second to the first quarter, in anticipation of strong
demand following EU entry. Other real effects included a strong increase in
investment, a surge in exports of mainly industrial and food products, and
a decline in imports. Notably, exports of food products rose significantly,
contrary to prior warnings from some politicians and economists about a
possible influx of less expensive Western food products following the accession. These fears were entirely unfounded. It should also be noted that in
April 2004, on the eve of the accession, exports rose at the annual rate of
41.6 per cent, while imports fell by 58.4 per cent, primarily due to-the alignment of tariffs with the common EU rates.
In addition to shocks in the real sphere, EU accession triggered a mild
inflation shock, caused mainly by higher VAT rates and excise taxes now
aligned with the EU norms. The inflation effect was additionally exacerbated by the decline in domestic supply of certain food products and construction materials which became unexpectedly popular among the buyers
in other EU countries.5 In consequence, HICP inflation rose from the
average rate of 0.7 per cent in 2003 to 3.4 per cent in the second half of
2004. Broad money balances showed a proportional increase to inflation.
Without doubt, EU accession augmented economic growth in Poland,
primarily through a surge in industrial production, investment and exports.
This" is a welcome development for monetary authorities because the
national income acceleration helps reduce welfare losses stemming from the
restrictive DIT policy. As a consequence, the EU accession shocks did not
have to be curtailed with active monetary policy responses.
Looking ahead, monetary policy during the final stage preceding euro
adoption will have to rely on the continuous commitment to disinflation,
but also incorporate the task of lowering the exchange rate risk. Therefore,
the strict variant of DIT is no longer a viable policy option during the
active preparations for the euro adoption.

6.5

SEQUENCING OF MONETARY POLICY FOR
THE EURO ADOPTION

There is a common understanding in the literature that the adoption of
the euro means relinquishing monetary autonomy of the candidate countries, but clearly there is no uniform 'one-size-fits-all'.policy prescription.
The ongoing debate on this subject includes a variety of proposals
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ranging from calls for a leap to unilateral euroization to a gradual convergence relying on an extended application, of flexible DIT. One may
however notice that with the passage of time the difference between an
early euroization and a gradual policy adjustment becomes increasingly
irrelevant. The bottom line is that Poland as well as other new member
states will enter the euro system as soon as they complete the fiscal, monetary and institutional convergence prescribed by the Maastricht criteria
and go through the two-year minimum quarantine imposed by the ERM
II rules.
The proponents of an early adoption of the euro, including Brafkowski
and Rostowski (2001), Buiter and Grafe (2002) and Begg et al. (2003) have
identified, a number of benefits from such a bold move. They include elimination of exchange rate risk, lower transaction costs, a more favourable
climate for foreign direct investment and a clear framework for macroeconomic policy discipline. However, a rush to a common currency may also
entail large costs, particularly if the institutional convergence is far
from complete (Nuti, 2002), making the domestic financial system vulnerable to default risk. In addition, the country entering a common currency
automatically relinquishes its monetary autonomy and the option to use
exchange rates as a tool for countering nominal (mostly demand-side)
shocks. In essence, an early euroization by itself is unlikely to resolve the
remaining problems related to the institutional fragility of the real
economy and the financial system; neither will it guarantee a necessary
fiscal discipline. This is because the institutional deficiencies have much
deeper roots than simply the monetary regime, and fiscal problems are a
function of more than just the availability of seigniorage revenues
(Eichengreen, 2005). For these reasons, the timing of formal euro adoption
should matter less than having in place well-coordinated monetary, real and
institutional convergence policies. A few more years of monetary independence combined with disciplined fiscal policies may allow enough time for
the necessary completion of institutional reforms.
The qualified reservations against a premature euroization along with the
Maastricht due process prescribed by the EU authorities have motivated
researchers to seek more gradual policy solutions to euro convergence. In
general terms, the gradualist proposals are based on various degrees of
departure from the current strict DIT regimes. They infuse greater
flexibility to various degrees by placing more or less balanced weights on
inflation and exchange rate stability targets. It becomes clear that the two
extreme solutions, namely a hard peg versus a full flexibility, which have
been dismissed in the literature as viable policy options (Fischer, 2001)
cannot work for the eurosystem accession programme. This is because
the euro convergence necessitates a dual focus on. price stability and the
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exchange rate stability. Thus flexibility becomes pragmatic in order to avoid
extreme solutions. A critical task is to cope with the exchange rate risk as
well as the interest rate risk, which entails an inflation risk premium when
adjusted to real interest rates (Orlowski, 2003; Holtemoller, 2005).
An extreme solution assigning preference to the exchange rate stability is
proposed by Bofinger and Wollmershauser (2001, 2002) who advocate
adopting a monetary regime based on flexible exchange rate targeting.6 In
their policy scenario, exchange rate stability becomes the key policy objective, while price stability plays a secondary role, as it is presumed to be
derived from less volatile exchange rates. However, their scenario implies a
significant regime switch whichmight prove to be too costly for those new
member states that follow DIT policies, including Poland, the Czech
Republic and, to a lesser degree, Hungary. This is because the primary commitment to the exchange rate stability objective may entail frequent and
costly foreign exchange market interventions, particularly if financial
markets continue to be vulnerable to large nominal shocks. In addition, it
is highly uncertain whether the monetary regime focusing on exchange rate
stability (even in a stricter form than the one allowed by the ERM II) will
actually contribute to price stability. This is because the exchange rate
channel of monetary policy transmission in the larger NMS such as Poland
is rather, unstable (Orlowski, 2003).7 Therefore, a smooth transmission of a
more stable exchange rate into low inflation is not automatically guaranteed upon assigning a strong priority to the exchange rate stability.
A more balanced weighting of inflation and exchange rate stability
targets is examined by Jonas (2004). His analysis focuses on the 'dual
target-one instrument' policy scenario as an extension of the present DIT
regimes, which assigns equal importance to the inflation and exchange rate
stability targets. A central bank uses interest rates as a single policy instrument to hit these, at times conflicting, targets. Possible conflicts between
them may arise in the presence of a simultaneous currency appreciation
and high inflation, when both are triggered by large capital inflows. In such
a case, a deliberate lowering of the domestic currency value requires an
interest rate cut, which in turn may jeopardize realization of the inflation
target. Also, higher interest rates aimed at containing inflation are likely to
aggravate currency appreciation and promulgate exchange rate volatility.
The conflicts between the targets are particularly severe in the presence, of
the Balassa-Samuelson effect.8 A number of studies have argued that such
an effect is prevalent, and contributes to high inflation in transition
economies (Buiter and Grafe, 2002; Begg et al., 2003; Mihaljek and Klau,
2004; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005). Others, particularly Egert et al.
(2003), show that this effect has now evaporated. A compelling empirical
study by Blaszkiewicz et al. (2004) shows that the Balassa-Samuelson
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effect in Poland has been negligible since 1999, while before that it was
quite pronounced, contributing between 1.5 and 2 per cent to annual
inflation. With the expiration of this effect, the potential conflicts between
inflation and exchange rate stability targets have little merit; so do the
arguments for an early euroization that are derived on the basis of this
effect. The strongest weight on inflation targets is assigned j n yet another
scenario of gradual policy adjustments proposed by Orlowski (2005b)
who introduces the monetary policy framework based on relative inflation
forecast targeting (RIFT). This operational framework is a forwardlooking extension to the DIT regimes pursued currently by Poland as well
as by several other new member states. It constitutes a viable solution for
the final passage towards the euro as it is likely to facilitate monetary
convergence and ensure a smooth entry to the euro system. Stating briefly,
RIFT is based on targeting the differentials between the candidate
country and the eurozone inflation forecasts, thus, in essence it is an
advanced variant of DIT, which in principle focuses on domestic inflation
only. Therefore, RIFT allows for combining a decisive commitment to
disinflation with an effective price convergence. In this advanced policy
framework, the inflation forecast differential becomes the key operating
target of monetary policy, while exchange rate stability is treated only as
one of the main indicator variables, and not as an auxiliary operating
target. RIFT enables policymakers to focus exclusively on price stability as
the main objective of monetary convergence. It therefore assigns priority
to lowering inflation when a possible conflict between disinflation and
exchange rate stability arises.
To underpin a successful monetary convergence to the euro, the proposed RIFT framework assumes a perfect identity between the long-term
inflation targets of the candidate country and the eurozone. Therefore, in
practical terms, the candidate's inflation based on HICP (harmonized
index of consumer prices) can reasonably be expected to converge to less
than 2 per cent by the time of the euro adoption. Instrumentalizatioft. of
RIFT is based on the 'instrument dichotomy', that is, on interest jate
adjustments in response to changes in the differential between domestic
and' eurozone inflation forecasts, while exchange rate stability is secured
with, foreign exchange market interventions. Thus, in essence, RIFT is an
elaborate combination, of a forward-looking DIT and a managed float.
Shocks to the exchange rate can be curtailed with higher interest rates only
if they are destabilizing (elevating the exchange rate risk premium) and
potentially threatening to realization of the inflation target.9
It seems plausible and necessary to modify the current. Polish monetary
regime based on strict DIT and the pure float by introducing solutions
consistent with the proposed RIFT strategy. The NBP is presently well
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equipped to consider such regime adjustment as it has developed an
advanced inflation forecasting methodology, as well as the ability to apply
efficiently indirect instruments of monetary policy implementation. In
addition, the RIFT framework is unlikely to interfere with the ramifications
of ERM II, since it also incorporates the precept of lowering the exchange
rate risk premium. Nevertheless, the operational viability of such a complex monetary policy framework is yet to be tested.
In sum, the current strict DIT in Poland needs to be modified by incorporating the exchange rate stability objective. The same is required of
other DIT countries pursuing monetary convergence to the euro (Jonas
and Mishkin, 2003; Jonas, 2004; Orlowski, 2005b). Regardless of the
selected direction of DIT modification, Poland can and should avail itself
of the exchange rate flexibility afforded by ERM II, providing that the
'standard' plus-minus 15 per cent band of currency fluctuations will be
upheld, rather than the 'normal' band of 2.25 per cent prescribed originally by ERM I. It is, however, likely that the future band surrounding the
official reference rate to the euro will be asymmetric, that is, wider on
the appreciation side and much narrower (perhaps only 2.25 per cent) on
the depreciation side. Under such circumstances, a tighter, than normal
stance of monetary policy will be required in order to accommodate the
prevalent exchange rate risk premium Within the short-term interest rate
target. Moreover, frequent interventions will be called for in the presence
of even relatively mild shocks to the exchange rate. Due to these constraints, remaining in the ERM II beyond the required two-year minimum
period is not advisable.
Reformulation of Poland's monetary policy upon entry to ERM II will
take into consideration a proper choice of the. PLN per EUR reference rate.
This choice is critically important. In principle, the official 'de jure' reference rate should correspond with the 'de facto' rate that is technically perceived as a sustainable long-run equilibrium rate as' determined by .the
financial markets. Mis-specification of the official rate at a level considerably different from the market rate may lead to a number of destabilizing
consequences. These can be encapsulated as follows:
(1)

A considerably stronger official rate than the market rate may precipitate short-term capital inflows, exacerbating inflation. The unfavourable risk structure of capital inflows, may result from expectations of
an official devaluation.
(2), A weaker official rate is likely to inflate the domestic value of foreign
currency debt and raise the default risk.
(3) Mis-specification of the official rate may effectively narrow the
exchange rate tolerance hand, as its perceived percentage boundaries
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(4)

(5)
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will surround the long-run equilibrium market rate, not the official
rate. This scenario will necessitate more frequent, seemingly asymmetric foreign exchange market interventions.
A mis-specified official rate may function as a magnet, pulling the
market rate in a wrong, subdptimal direction (Schadler, 2004) that
may in turn threaten realization of the inflation target.
In general terms, the greater gap between the official rate and the
market equilibrium .rate is likely to exacerbate exchange rate risk
(volatility) as its choice will appear to be less credible and expect-:
ations of rate resetting will arise. This risk will be greater if the
official rate is too weak, as the'markets are likely to expect either
resetting of the official rate or an easing of monetary policy in an
effort to adhere to its actual level'. The easier policy stance will be
suboptimal as it will clearly jeopardize realization of the inflation
target.

Considering the serious dangers of the official rate mis-rspecification, its
careful and thorough estimation and determination becomes a critical task.
So far, the attempts to determine the long-run equilibrium rate for Poland
have produced mixed and rather inconclusive results. Steady-state equilibrium conditions modelled by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) have arrived at
some suggestions. In contrast, Johanssen cointegration tests employed by
Orlowski (2004a) have not produced conclusive results due to frequent
regime changes, a high exchange rate risk premium and unstable key monetary variables applied in cointegrating equations.
There is a further complexity in the determination of the appropriate reference rate. This stems from the prevalent risk premia that are built into the
equilibrium exchange rate (Orlowski, 2004b). Uncertainties about fiscal
discipline and political stability may bring down the perceived market rate
and demand a much tighter monetary .policy stance, that is, higher interest
rates encapsulating such exogenous risk premia. Needless to say, the choice
of the official rate must take into account the political risk and the fiscal
policy outlook. In order to accommodate these risks, the official rate might
be set at a slightly higher level than the long-run equilibrium rate perceived
by the market.
The process of selecting the appropriate official ERM II reference rate
for PLN will require the application of correct procedures and robust formulas. It is imperative not to determine the reference rate too soon (as
appears to be the case in Hungary) in order to alleviate the above-listed
serious dangers of its mis-specification.
To reiterate, it-is advisable for Poland to continue the reliance of its monetary policy on inflation targeting to the very end of the euro convergence
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process. Yet, DIT needs to become more flexible in order to incorporate the
exchange rate stability objective into the framework that will preserve the
NBP commitment to price stability. The proposed RIFT framework
appears to be viable for accomplishing these tasks.

6.6

A SYNTHESIS: IMPLICATIONS F O R F U T U R E
E M U ACCESSION

Several important prescriptions for successful EU accession and an
effective pursuit of convergence to the euro have emerged from the Polish
experience. At the forefront is the ability to maintainfiscal,discipline, which
is a function of the authorities' resilience to political pressures on government spending. Equally important is the development of a simplified,
transparent tax system, ultimately leading to adoption of a flat linear tax
set at a low rate that is competitive within the EU.
With respect to adjustments to the monetary regime, the objective of
disinflation and price stability plays a critical role for balancing the attainment of long-term economic growth and convergence to the euro. A flexible
DIT framework is believed to be conducive to achieving such balance. At
the initial stage of convergence to the EU and EMU, a strict DIT supported
with high real interest rates was effective for lowering inflation to a manageable, single-digit level. Yet, a strict DIT is not conducive to convergence
to the euro, as the task of achieving exchange rate, stability, or more precisely, lowering the exchange rate risk will have to be incorporated in the
DIT framework.
Following Orlowski (2005b), this study advocates, for the final passage
towards the euro, the RIFT framework which prioritizes realignment of the
inflation forecast of the candidate and the eurozone and incorporates the
exchange rate stability objective (within the ERM II) as the policy indicator variable. Adherence to the relative inflation forecast is achieved primarily by adjusting the differential between domestic and eurozone interest
rates, while exchange rate stability is secured with, cautiously applied
foreign exchange market interventions.
In general terms, a successful completion of the EU/EMU convergence
process necessitates enacting policies that would reinforce resilience to
various types of financial risk. Among others, disciplined fiscal and monetary policies need to be in place in order to mitigate the exchange rate
risk. In the case of Poland, such policies are entirely possible providing
that a stable political climate, free of populist claims and pressures, is
preserved.
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* I thank Ali M. Kutan and Jiirgen von Hagen for valuable comments and suggestions. I
remain, however, solely responsible for the views presented in this chapter and for all possible errors and omissions.
1. The Maastricht inflation convergence requirement calls for a euro-candidate country to
achieve sustainable inflation not exceeding 1.5 per cent above the average of the three
lowest inflation EU members The benchmark rate specified in the October 2004 ECB
Convergence Report was 3.4 per cent.
2. Specifically, the Ministry of Finance had to introduce equal taxation of goods irrespective of their origin, as well as special VAT schemes concerning travel agents,
second-hand goods, investment in gold, and farm products. Special tax provisions
had to be granted for intra-Community transactions (European Commission, 2003).
During the course of accession negotiations, Poland was granted a number of derogations on VAT adjustments for residential housing, selected goods and periodicals
(until the end of 2007), as well as a large number of food products (until the end of
April 2008).
3. Yet, the ability to cut spending will pose a major challenge. Following argument by von
Hagen et al. (2001), fiscal adjustments are successfulif they are based on cuts in transfer
payments, rather than on tax increases or cuts in government consumption and investments. Due to unfavourable demographic developments and strong political pressures,
there is currently little chance of reducing transfer payments in Poland.
4. Own estimates based on Ministry of Finance data.
5. For instance, in June 2004 domestic prices of beef rose by 13.8 per cent, poultry 13.4 per
cent, butter 7 per cent and sugar 48.5 per cent (additionally triggered by hoarding purchases), relative to their level from the year before. Prices of building materials rose 11.4
per cent.
6. A similar recognition of the exchange rate stability target is presented by Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003).
7. A more optimistic view is presented by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) whose empirical tests
indicate a seemingly robust channel of monetary policy transmission in the Central
European countries, including Poland.
8. The Balassa-Samuelson effect is based on the argument that there is a productivity shock
in the tradable goods sector in an open economy, which in turn drives up wages of nont'radables and subsequently contributes to chronic inflation.
,9. The] debate on designing an optimal monetary policy framework for convergence to the
euro focuses mainly on relative importance of low inflation versus exchange rate stability
targets. However, equally challenging, yet inadequately addressed, are issues of appropriate choices of policy instruments. The advocated separation of interest rate adjustments
in' response to the inflation target, and market intervention aimed at stabilizing the
exchange rate seems to be in opposition to the calls for integrating both instruments presented by the proponents of using the monetary conditions index (MCI) as an instrument
rule. Such a rule is, for instance, endorsed for Turkey by Us (2004). Yet, its implementation might be technically very difficult, if not impossible, at least in the case of Poland.
Because the MCI rule-based policy may send conflicting signals about the policy stance,
it may inhibit central bank credibility.

REFERENCES
Begg, D., B. Eichengreen, L. Halpern, J. von Hagen and C. Wyplosz (2003),
'Sustainable regimes of capital movements in accession countries', CEPR Policy
Paper No. 10.

Monetary andfiscalpolicy in Poland during EU accession

199

Blaszkiewicz, M., P. Kowalski, L. Rawdanowicz and P. Wozniak (2004), 'HarrodBalassa-Samuelson Effect in selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe',
Report No. 57, Warszawa: Centrum Analiz Spol-eczno-Ekonomicznych
(CASE).
Bofinger, P. and T. Wollmershauser (2001), 'Is there a third way to EMU for the EU
accession countries?', Economic Systems, 25 (3), 253-74.
Bofinger, P. and T. Wollmershauser (2002), 'Exchange rate policies for the transition to EMU', in Urmas Sepp and Martin Randveer (eds), Alternative Monetary
Regimes in Entry to EMU, Tallinn, Estonia: Bank of Estonia, pp. 95-132.
Bratkowski, A. and J. Rostowski (2001), 'Unilateral adoption of the euro by EU
applicant countries: the macroeconomic aspects', in Lucjan T. Orlowski (ed.),
Transition and Growth in Post-communist Countries: The Ten-year Experience,
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 125—47.
Bruno, M. (1992), 'Stabilization and reform in Eastern Europe: a preliminary evaluation', IMF Staff Papers, 39 (4), 741-77.
Buiter, W. and C. Grafe (2002), 'Patching up the Pact - some suggestions for
enhancing fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability in an enlarged
European Union', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3496.
Christofferssen, P.R. and R.S. Wescott (1999), 'Is Poland ready for inflation targeting?', IMF Working Paper 'No. 99/41, Washington, DC: International Monetary
Fund.
De Grauwe, P. arid G.G. Schnabl (2005), 'Nominal versus real convergence: EMU
entry scenarios for the new member states', Kyklos, 68 (4), 537-55" v
Dibooglu, S. and A.M. Kutan (2005), 'Sources of inflation and output movements
in Poland and Hungary: policy implications for accession to the economic, and
monetary union', Journal of Macroeconomics, 27 (2), 107-31.
Egert, B., I. Drine, K. Lommatzsch and C. Rault (2003), 'The Balassa-Samuelson
effect in Central and Eastern Europe: myth or reality?', Journal of Comparative
Economics, 31 (3), 552-72.
Eichengreen, B.L. (2005), 'Can emerging markets float? Should they inflation
target?', in Rebecca L. Driver, Peter J.N. Sinclair and Christoph Thoenissen (eds),
Exchange Rates, Capital Flows and Policy, London: Routledge, pp. 10-38.
European Commission (2003), Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland's
Preparation for Membership, Brussels, November 5.
Fischer, S. (2001), 'Exchange rate regimes: is thebipolar view correct?', Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 15 (2), 3-24.
Gelos, R.G. and R. Sahay (2001), 'Financial market spillovers in transition
economies', Economics of Transition, 9 (1), 53-86.
Golinelli, R. and R.R. Rovelli (2005), 'Monetary policy, transmission, interest rate
rules and inflation targeting in three transition countries', Journal of Banking and
Finance, 29(1), 183-201.
Hallerberg, M., R. Strauch and J. von Hagen (2004), 'The design of fiscal rules
andforms of governments in European Union countries', ECB Working Paper
No. 419.
Holtemoller, O. (2005), 'Uncovered interest rate parity and analysis of monetary
convergence of potential EMU accession countries', International Economics and
Economic Policy, 2 (1), 33-63.
Jonas, J. (2004), 'Euro adoption and Maastricht criteria: rules or discretion?',
University of Bonn-Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI): Working
Paper B14/2004.

200

Macroeconomic policies for EU accession

Jonas, J. and F.S. Mishkin (2003), 'Inflation targeting in transition economies: experience and prospects, NBER Working Paper No. 9667.
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, E. (2004), 'Financial conditions of Poland's accession to
the European Union', in Elzbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska and E. Synowiec (eds),
Poland in the European Union, Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute,
pp. 13-36.
Kenen, P. and E.E. Meade (2003), 'EU accession and euro: close together or far
apart?', Institute for International Economics: International Policy Briefs No.
PB03-9.
King, M.A..(1996), 'How should central banks reduce inflation? Conceptual issues',
in New Challenges for Monetary Policy: A Symposium sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri, pp. 53-92.
Linne, T. (1999), 'Contagion effects of Central and East European currency crises',
Halle Institute for Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 96;
Masson, P.R. (1999), 'Monetary and exchange rate policy of transition economies
of Central and Eastern Europe after the launch of EMU', IMF Policy Discussion
Paper No. PDP/99/5, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Mihaljek, D. and M. Klau (2004), 'The Balassa-Samuelson effect in Central
Europe: a disaggregated analysis', Comparative Economic Studies, 46 (1), 63-94.
Mishkin, F.S. (2000), 'Inflation targeting in emerging-market countries', American
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 90 (2), 105-9.
Natalucci, F.M. and Federico Ravenna (2003), 'The road to adopting the Euro:
monetary policies and exchange rate regimes in EU accession countries', mimeo,
Washington, DC: The Federal Reserve Board - Division of International
Finance.
Nuti, M.D. (2002), 'Costs and benefits of unilateral euroisation in Central Eastern
Europe', Economics of Transition, 10 (3), 419-44.
Orlowski, L.T. (2000), 'Direct inflation targeting in Central Europe', Post-Soviet
Geography and Economics, 41 (2), 134—54.
Orlowski, L.T. (2001a), 'Central European economies in the aftermath of the
Russian payment crisis', in Lucjan T. Orlowski (ed.), Transition and Growth in
Post-communist Countries: The Ten-year Experience, Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 148-65.
Orlowski, L.T. (2001b), 'From inflation targeting to the euro-peg: a model of monetary convergence for transition economies', Economic Systems, 25 (3), 233-51.
Orlowski, L.T. (2003), 'Monetary convergence and risk premiums in the EU accession countries', Open Economies Review, 14 (3), 251-67.
Orlowski, L.T. (2004a), 'Money rules for the eurozone candidate countries', Journal
of Policy Modelling, 26 (7), 817-37.
Orlowski, L.T. (2004b), 'Exchange rate risk and convergence to the euro',
University of Bonn-Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI), Working
Paper B25/2004.
Orlowski, L.T. (2005a); 'Monetary convergence of the EU accession countries to
the eurozone: a theoretical framework and policy implications', Journal of
Banking and Finance, 29 (1), 203-25.
Orlowski, L.T. (2005b), 'Targeting relative inflation forecast as monetary policy
framework for adopting the euro', William Davidson Institute Working Paper
No. 754, University of Michigan School of Business.
Republic of Poland (2004), Convergence Program, Warsaw: Council of Ministers,
www.mofnet.gov.pl, April 30.

Monetary andfiscalpolicy in Poland during EU accession

201

Rogoff, K.S., A.M. Husain, A. Mody, R. Brooks and N. Oomes (2003), 'Evolution
and performance of exchange rate regimes', IMF Working Paper No. 03/243,
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Sachs, ID. (1993), Poland's Jump to the Market Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Schadler, S. (2004), 'European macroeconomic challenges and EU enlargement',
Paper to the 17 Symposium Moneda y Credito, Madrid, November 18-19.
Svensson, L.E.O. (1999), 'Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule', Journal of
Monetary Economics, 43 (3), 607-54.
Us, V. (2004), 'Monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey under the "Monetary
Conditions Index: an alternative policy rule', Applied Economics, 36 (9), 967-76.
von Hagen, J, A. Hughes-Hallett and R. Strauch (2001), 'Budgetary consolidation
in EMU', Economics Paper No. 148, Brussels: European Commission.

